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Date when decision was rendered: 1.5.2000 Judicial body: Salo Court of First Instance = Salo tingsrätt = Salon käräjäoikeus Reference to source Registry of the Salo Court of First Instance Salo tingsrätts registratorskontor Salon käräjäoikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions section 21 of the Constitution Act = grundlagen 21 § = perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6 Abstract While a case was pending before the court of first instance, one of the defendants claimed that the charges against him should be dropped as the case against him had not been dealt with without undue delay or within a reasonable time as provided for in section 21 of the Constitution Act and Article 6 of the ECHR.Referring to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, he claimed that if a case had been pending for over approximately 5 years and 6 months, the requirement of reasonable time had been exceeded, leading to a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR.The case against him had been pending for 5 years and 9 months.The other defendants joined the claim. The court agreed with the defendant regarding the considerable length of the proceedings.However, it also stated that the case, which dealt with economic offences, was one of the most complicated and most extensive ones in the history of Finnish criminal law.The alleged crimes were very serious and the interests involved were considerable.As such the case could not be compared to other, less complicated cases.The pretrial investigations had been difficult and extensive.They had continued while the case was already pending and had produced a substantial amount of new and important evidence.The proceedings had been postponed several times, among other things, because of the fact that the prosecutor as well as legal counsels of some of the defendants had changed during the proceedings.One of the reasons for the delay was also the fact that it had in some cases been difficult to reach the defendants in order to serve the summons.The claims of the defendants regarding the summons had led to partial dismissal of actions.Following such decisions the possibility of appeal had been used both by the prosecutor and the defendants.While the decisions of the appeal courts were pending, the proceedings before the court of first instance had been delayed. With respect to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights the court pointed out that each case should be considered in view of the specific circumstances of the case and that actions, for which the state cannot be held responsible, constitute an objective factor which should be taken into account when considering the length of the proceedings.The court concluded that considering the magnitude and the specific circumstances of the case, the delay in the proceedings had not been undue and the requirement of dealing with a case within a reasonable time had not been exceeded.The decision of the court is not subject to appeal. See also Uoti v.Finland (Application no. 61222/00), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 January 2007. 28.10.2002 / 17.12.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 11.6.2004 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 1390; R2003/234 Reference to source KKO 2004:58. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2004 I January-June Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2004 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2004 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2004 Pages: 371-380 Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
effective remedy,
Relevant legal provisions section 21 of the Constitution Act = grundlagen 21 § = perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6-1; ECHR-13 Abstract A had imported a used car but had not paid the statutory taxes.The customs authorities had ordered A to pay the taxes.The court of first instance convicted A for tax fraud.A admitted that he had not paid the taxes, but claimed that the Finnish legislation concerning motor vehicle tax was contrary to European Community law and the imposed tax in his case was too high.In A's view, as the amount of tax was unclear, it was not possible to assess whether A was guilty of tax fraud.In another case, the Supreme Administrative Court had requested from the European Court of Justice a preliminary ruling concerning national legislation relating to motor vehicle tax.The ECJ gave its ruling while A's appeal was pending before the court of appeal.The decision supported A's claim.In deciding on A's appeal, the court of appeal took into account the preliminary ruling by the ECJ.By the time the appeal court gave its decision, the case against A had been pending for almost four years.The correct amount of taxes imposed on A had not been determined by that time, despite the ruling by the ECJ.With reference to the Constitution Act and the ECHR, the court of appeal ruled that the case against A had not been decided within a reasonable time as required by the provisions on the right to a fair trial.It ordered that the charges against A for tax fraud were to be dropped.The Supreme Court did not agree with the appeal court.It ruled that the decisive factor was not the correct amount of tax but the question whether A's actions fulfilled the essential elements of a tax fraud.In the Court's opinion they did, and A was convicted for tax fraud.When discussing the reasonable length of proceedings, the Supreme Court referred to the Constitution Act, the ECHR and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Kudla v.Poland (judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-XI), Pietiläinen v.Finland (judgment of 5 November 2002) and Kangasluoma v.Finland (judgment of 20 January 2004).The Court pointed out that it is possible to take the lapse of time into account when deciding on the punishment.However, the Finnish law does not contain any provisions on the basis of which it would be possible to drop charges on the grounds that the length of proceedings has been unreasonable.The Court admitted that in some exceptional cases dropping or dismissing charges could be the only effective remedy as required by Article 13 of the ECHR.However, A's case was not such an exception.The Supreme Court agreed that the proceedings had taken a long time (five and a half years by that time).This was partly due to the actions of the authorities and the question of determining the correct amount of tax, partly due to A's own actions.A main hearing at the court of first instance had been postponed because of A's absence.In addition, A had himself claimed that his guilt could not be assessed before the correct amount of tax had been determined.The Court continued that, when considering the meaning of the length of proceedings, it had to be kept in mind that A's actions were undisputed and a conviction was to be expected.Furthermore, the final amount of tax imposed on A could in this case only be lower and thus more favourable to A.Considering the circumstances in the case, it could not be assumed that the length of proceedings would have had especially negative consequences for A.The Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings had not been prolonged to such an unreasonable length that A's sentence should be waived or that it could be mitigated because of the length of proceedings. 22.4.2005 / 3.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 25.5.2005 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report no. 1327; S2003/983 Reference to source KKO 2005:66. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2005 I January-June Avgörande av Högsta domstolen I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2005 Pages: pp. 477-481 Subject
compensation,
fair trial,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 3, section 2 and Chapter 5, section 1 of the Tort Liability Act = skadeståndslag 3 kapitel 2 § och 5 kapitel 1 § = vahingonkorvauslaki 3 luku 2 § ja 5 luku 1 §. ECHR-6-1 Abstract A's driver's licence was temporarily suspended, because she was suspected of having been under the influence of narcotics when driving a car.The suspension took in fact close to four years, owing to the fact that the pretrial investigation in the matter was not completed within a reasonable time.A had had a temporary driver's licence only, valid for two years.She had completed the first part of her training in driving school and, in order to obtain a permanent driver's licence, she was to take a second training session before the temporary licence expired.Because of the suspension, she was not able to do so, and was eventually obliged to start her training from the beginning.A sued the state for damages demanding compensation for economic loss, including both the driving school costs and the inconvenience caused by the fact that she was not allowed to use her car for several years. Under the Tort Liability Act, a public corporation is liable for damages caused through an error or negligence in the exercise of public authority, if the performance of the activity or task, in view of its nature and purpose, has not met the reasonable requirements set for it.In such cases, damages shall not only constitute compensation for personal injury or damage to property but also compensation for economic loss.In this case, it was undisputed that A was entitled to damages because of the excessive length of the pretrial investigation and of the suspension of her driver's licence.The question was rather what kind of economic loss should be covered.The court of first instance ruled that A was entitled to damages from the state for the costs caused by A having to retake her courses in driving school, but rejected A's other claims as being without a foundation in law.The court of appeal held that the length of the pretrial investigation and of the suspension of A's driver's licence were unreasonable and in violation of Article 6-1 of the ECHR.In view of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the state was therefore liable to pay damages also for the inconvenience caused by the suspension of the driver's licence.The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal, but based its decision on the Tort Liability Act only, without any reference to the ECHR.It held that obtaining a driver's licence requires an investment and losing the right to drive had in this case prevented A from making use of that investment.It had been difficult for A to move around and run her errands without her own car, and it may also have caused her difficulties in finding a job.The Supreme Court concluded that A was entitled to damages from the state also regarding the inconvenience caused by the suspension of her driver's licence. 26.5.2006 / 26.5.2006 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 15.6.2005 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report no. 1475; R2005/46 Reference to source KKO 2005:73. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2005 I January-June Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2005 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2005 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2005 Pages: pp. 513-521 Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 6, section 7-3 of the Penal Code; section 21 of the Constitution Act = strafflagen 6 kapitel 7 § 3 mom.; grundlagen 21 § = rikoslaki 6 luku 7 § 3 mom.; perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6-1; ECHR-13 Abstract A and B had been sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment for tax fraud and an accounting offence committed in 1993-1995.The pretrial investigation began in 1995, proceedings before the court of first instance were initiated in 2001, and the court rendered its decision in 2002.A and B appealed against the decision to a court of appeal and further to the Supreme Court.They claimed, among other things, that their sentences should be reduced or made conditional because of the excessive length of the proceedings.By its decision given in 2004, the court of appeal reduced the sentences to 16 months on the grounds that A and B had compensated the damage caused by their criminal acts.The appeal court did not refer to the length of proceedings as a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court found that the crimes committed by A and B were typical economic offences and the matter was not especially complex or exceptionally extensive.A and B had not contributed to the delay in the pretrial investigation and the court proceedings.As a whole, the case had been pending for an exceptionally long time (close to 10 years).The Supreme Court ruled that the length of the proceedings was in violation of the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time as prescribed in section 21 of the Constitution Act and Article 6 of the ECHR.Therefore, A and B were entitled to redress which could be afforded by reducing the sentences from what they normally would have been.In the Supreme Court's view, the punishment meted out by the court of appeal was reasonable on the grounds cited by the appeal court.However, the Supreme Court also took into account the length of the proceedings and paid specific attention to the preventive and retributive effect of punishment under the circumstances.It concluded that an equitable punishment in this case was 10 months' imprisonment for each defendant.Due to the fact that the sentence of imprisonment in corresponding cases of economic offences has in general been unconditional, the Supreme Court found no justifiable reason to mitigate the sentence of each defendant to a conditional one. In discussing the issue of reasonable length of proceedings, the Supreme Court referred to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Kudla v.Poland (judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-XI), Beck v.Norway (judgment of 26 June 2001), Pietiläinen v.Finland (judgment of 5 November 2002), Kangasluoma v.Finland (judgment of 20 January 2004) and Uhl v.Germany (judgment of 10 February 2005). 29.5.2006 / 29.5.2006 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 29.11.2004 Judicial body: Turku Court of Appeal = Åbo hovrätt = Turun hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 3202; S04/2115 Reference to source Registry of the Turku Court of Appeal Åbo hovrätts registratorskontor Turun hovioikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
effective remedy,
Relevant legal provisions section 21 of the Constitution Act = grundlagen 21 § = perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6-1; ECHR-13 Abstract A state-owned asset management company was claiming damages from the board members of a bank concerning credit decisions which had been issued in 1989-1991 and had resulted in considerable loss of credit for the bank.The damages claimed were exceptionally large (90 million euros).The defendants argued that the claims should be rejected due to the unreasonable length of the proceedings.The case had been pending before the court of first instance over ten and a half years. The court of first instance drew attention to the fact that the case was exceptionally complicated and involved several separate proceedings.The main reason for the prolonged proceedings was that the court had considered it expedient to wait for the decision in a criminal case forming a part of the same complex of proceedings and involving claims for damages.The decision in this latter case was expected to clarify the grounds for the liability for damages and was thus of relevance with regard to this particular claim for damages as well.The court held that the defendants had not by their actions in any way prolonged the proceedings.Several proposals for a settlement had been made in the case but they had been unsuccessful. The court based its decision on section 21 of the Constitution Act (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time) and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.It also referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the cases of Kudla v.Poland (judgment of 26 October 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-XI) and Jablonská v.Poland (judgment of 9 March 2004), and to several cases against Finland concerning the unreasonable length of proceedings.The court discussed the criteria for the assessment of a reasonable or unreasonable length of proceedings as well as effective remedies in case of prolonged court proceedings.It concluded that the case had not been dealt with within a reasonable time as required under section 21 of the Constitution Act and Article 6 of the ECHR.Considering Article 13 of the ECHR ending the proceedings was in the court's view in this case the only available effective remedy in order to prevent the violation of the defendants' human rights.The court ruled that as the requirements for a fair trial could not be fulfilled the case against the defendants is to be dismissed. The court of appeal did not agree with the first instance court.It stated that the Finnish legislation does not contain any provisions on the basis of which a claim could be dismissed due to an unreasonable length of proceedings.It is not required in the ECHR or in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights that proceedings before a court should be closed due to their unreasonable length.In arguing its decision the court of first instance had also referred to Supreme Court decision 2004:58 in which it is held that in order to guarantee a fair trial for a defendant in a criminal case, in some exceptional cases dropping or dismissing charges could be the only effective remedy as required by Article 13 of the ECHR.Unlike the court of first instance, the court of appeal held that this statement is not as such applicable to a civil procedure in which the plaintiff and the defendant are equal as parties.Under Article 6 of the ECHR and section 21 of the Constitution Act, the plaintiff has a right to have the case dealt with in a court of law and a right to a final court decision, despite the fact that the proceedings have been unreasonably long.The court of appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance and returned the matter to the lower court.The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (decision no. 864 of 12 April 2005). See also Vienonen and Others v.Finland (Application no. 36989/05), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 24 March 2009. 30.5.2006 / 31.3.2009 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 7.11.2005 Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 3596; R05/86 Reference to source Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
effective remedy,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 6, sections 7-3 and 12-4 of the Penal Code; section 21-1 of the Constitution Act = strafflagen 6 kapitel 7 § 3 mom., 6 kapitel 12 § 4 mom.; grundlagen 21 § 1 mom. = rikoslaki 6 luku 7 § 3 mom., 6 luku 12 § 4 mom.; perustuslaki 21 § 1 mom. ECHR-6-1; ECHR-13 Abstract In a case concerning tax fraud, the court of first instance dismissed the charges against the defendants because of the excessive length of the proceedings.At the time of the court's decision, the case had been pending for seven years.One of the main reasons for the lengthy proceedings had been the shortage of staff at the investigating authority (the customs) combined with the large number of cases under investigation.The court of first instance also found that the investigation had been partly inadequate and cursory.In Finnish legislation there are no explicit provisions on the basis of which charges could be dismissed on account of the excessive length of proceedings.However, the court of first instance referred to the ECHR and to a decision of the Supreme Court (KKO 2004:58 of 11 June 2004), in which the Supreme Court ruled that in some exceptional cases, dismissing the charges could be the only effective remedy under Article 13 of the ECHR in order to guarantee the right to a fair trial of the defendant.The Supreme Court mentioned as an example a situation where the defendant's rights of defence have been completely ruined because of the length of the proceedings.The court of first instance held that this is what had happened in this case concerning tax fraud and decided to dismiss the charges in order to protect the defendants' due process guarantees.The court of appeal concurred with the lower court's finding that there had been defects in the investigation of the case.However, in the appeal court's opinion these defects had not been directly caused by the length of the proceedings and had not impaired the defendants' rights of defence.The question had rather been whether the evidence against the defendants was sufficient, and this issue had been resolved in the decision of the appeal court, when the court dismissed most of the charges against the defendants in absence of sufficient evidence.The court of appeal concluded that the circumstances of the case were not exceptional in the sense that all charges against the defendants should be dismissed on the grounds referred to in the Supreme Court decision quoted by the first instance court.Instead, the appeal court took into account the excessive length of the proceedings when assessing the punishment.The decision is final.The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in the case (decision no.R2006/35 of 29 March 2006). 3.4.2007 / 3.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 1.2.2006 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report no. 211; R2004/281 Reference to source KKO 2006:11. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2006 I January-June Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2006 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2006 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2006 Pages: pp. 80-92 Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 40, section 10 of the Penal Code; section 27 of the Act on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters; section 21 of the Constitution Act = strafflagen 40 kapitel 10 §; lag om internationell rättshjälp i straffrättsliga ärenden 27 §; grundlagen 21 § = rikoslaki 40 luku 10 §; laki kansainvälisestä oikeusavusta rikosasioissa 27 §; perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6 Abstract Three tax administration officials had been sentenced to a fine for having acted contrary to their official duty.They had used in a tax audit report information which had been obtained by the police from the authorities of a foreign country in the form of mutual assistance in criminal matters and which had been afforded on condition that it is not used for fiscal purposes.The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts' judgment.However, in assessing the punishment the Court also considered the length of the proceedings against the defendants.The offence had been committed in 1997.The defendants were questioned in 1998 and 1999, the proceedings before the first instance court started in 2000 and the court gave its decision in 2001.The decision of the appeal court was issued in 2004.The Supreme Court held that, considering the complexity of the case, the proceedings as a whole were not excessive to such an extent that the delay as such would have constituted a violation of the defendants' rights.However, the Court noted that the deed that led to charges against the defendants was committed while the defendants were carrying out a task incumbent on them as officials responsible for tax supervision.In the Court's view, the lengthy proceedings were likely to cause insecurity and inconvenience to the defendants in carrying out their duties.This could have been avoided, had the proceedings been conducted more speedily.For this reason, the Court held that the delay was in violation of the defendants' right to have their case dealt with by a court within a reasonable time, as prescribed in section 21 of the Constitution Act and Article 6 of the ECHR.The Court also referred to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Kangasluoma v.Finland (judgment of 20 January 2004) and Lehtinen v.Finland (judgment of 13 September 2005).With reference to the length of proceedings and to the Penal Code, the Court decided to waive the punishment. 11.4.2007 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 18.4.2006 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report no. 855; R2004/449 Reference to source KKO 2006:33. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2006 I January-June Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2006 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2006 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2006 Pages: pp. 222-232 Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 6, sections 7-3 and 12-4, and Chapter 40, section 11 of the Penal Code; section 21 of the Constitution Act = strafflagen 6 kapitel 7 § 3 punkten och 12 § 4 punkten, 40 kapitel 11 §; grundlagen 21 § = rikoslaki 6 luku 7 § 3 kohta ja 12 § 4 kohta, 40 luku 11 §; perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6 Abstract A court of appeal had sentenced X to conditional imprisonment and dismissal for aggravated abuse of public office.In addition, both X and Y were sentenced to a fine for negligent violation of official duties.Both defendants appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld the appeal court's decision in part, but dismissed some of the charges because of statute of limitations.When assessing the punishment the Court also took into account the length of the proceedings against the defendants.The offences had been committed in 1996 and 1997.The investigation was initiated in 1997 and the defendants were questioned for the first time as suspects in 1999.Proceedings before the court of first instance started in 2002, and the court gave its decision in 2003.The appeal court's decision followed in 2004.X was suspended from office from 1997 until he was given notice in 2002.He found a new job but lost it because of the charges against him.Y was suspended in 1999 and he resigned in 2003.In its decision, the Supreme Court held that, considering the complexity and nature of the case, the proceedings as a whole were not excessive to such an extent that the delay as such would necessarily have constituted a violation of the defendants' rights.However, in the Court's opinion, it must be taken into account that the defendants had lost their jobs because of the offences.Considering this, the excessive proceedings have been likely to create feelings of uncertainty about the future as well as inconvenience which could have been avoided, had the proceedings been carried out more speedily.For this reason the Supreme Court found that the delay in the proceedings was in violation of the defendants' right to have their case dealt with by a court within a reasonable time, as prescribed in section 21 of the Constitution Act and Article 6 of the ECHR.The Court also referred to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Kangasluoma v.Finland (judgment of 20 January 2004) and Lehtinen v.Finland (judgment of 13 September 2005).With reference to the length of proceedings and to the Penal Code, the Court decided to waive the fine imposed on the defendants.The sentence of conditional imprisonment and dismissal imposed on X was upheld. 11.4.2007 / 16.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 25.4.2006 Judicial body: Vaasa Court of Appeal = Vasa hovrätt = Vaasan hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 571; R04/1366 Reference to source Registry of the Vaasa Court of Appeal Vasa hovrätts registratorskontor Vaasan hovioikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
freedom of expression,
respect for private life,
fair trial,
presumption of innocence,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 6, sections 7-3 and 12-4, and Chapter 24, section 10 of the Penal Code; sections 10, 12 and 21 of the Constitution Act; section 5-1-1 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings; sections 1 and 22 of the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media = strafflagen 6 kapitel 7 § 3 punkten och 12 § 4 punkten, 24 kapitel 10 §; grundlagen 10 §, 12 § och 21 §; lag om offentlighet vid rättegång 5 § 1 mom. 1 punkten; lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation 1 § och 22 § = rikoslaki 6 luku 7 § 3 kohta ja 12 § 4 kohta, 24 luku 10 §; perustuslaki 10 §, 12 § ja 21 §; laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta 5 § 1 mom. 1 kohta; laki sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnässä 1 § ja 22 §. ECHR-10; ECHR-6; CCPR-19 Abstract A former tax administration officer X had published a book in which she claimed, among other things, that tax inspector Y had, in a trial which was concerning tax fraud and in which X had acted as a witness for the defence, committed perjury by swearing to the correctness of a tax audit report which in X's opinion was based on false calculations.X also claimed that there was no risk that Y herself would face trial, because her husband was a district prosecutor working at the Office of the Prosecutor General.The court of first instance convicted X for aggravated defamation and ordered that the book is forfeited and the trial documentation kept secret for a period of 15 years.X appealed to the court of appeal, which in its decision discussed at length freedom of expression as secured in Article 10 of the ECHR and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Selistö v.Finland (judgment of 16 November 2004); Nikula v.Finland (judgment of 21 March 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-II); Lesnik v.Slovakia (judgment of 11 March 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-IV) and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v.Denmark (judgment of 17 December 2004, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-XI). The court of appeal noted that the tax administration exercises significant public powers and that legal safeguards in taxation issues had for a long time been a subject of public debate.The court saw X's book as a contribution to this debate.However, the court pointed out that freedom of expression must not overstep certain bounds with respect to the rights and reputation of others and that freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities which also apply to the media even in matters of great public concern.Also, the more serious the allegation, the more solid the factual basis has to be.In this case, criticism had been directed at an ordinary tax inspector, who was not in a leading position, and it was claimed that she had committed a serious offence.No grounds had been presented in support of the allegations which had decreased Y's public credibility and violated her right to be presumed innocent.The court agreed that, as a civil servant using public authority, Y is subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than a private individual.However, the court found that X's allegations exceeded the bounds for acceptable criticism, and that interference with X's freedom of expression was under the circumstances necessary and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The court also ruled that there was no need to forfeit the book.Instead, the author and the printing house were ordered to remove from the book the lines which had caused X's conviction.The court also quashed the lower court's decision regarding the secrecry of the trial documentation.Finally, the court considered the length of the proceedings (six years) in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and found that, though the proceedings had been excessive, the delay had not caused X harm to the extent that her punishment should be reduced on account of the length of proceedings.The decision is final as leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused (decision no. 320; R2006/560, of 2 March 2007). See also Mariapori v.Finland (application no. 37751/07), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 6 July 2010. 12.4.2007 / 3.3.2011 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 31.1.2006 Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 229; R03/3864 Reference to source HelHO 2006:5. Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta Date of publication: Subject
fair trial,
reasonable time,
effective remedy,
Relevant legal provisions section 21 of the Constitution Act = grundlagen 21 § = perustuslaki 21 §. ECHR-6 Abstract In a case concerning aggravated tax fraud, the court of first instance considered, as a preliminary question, the defendant's claim that the charges against him should be dismissed without considering the merits because of the excessive length of the proceedings.The court found that Finnish legislation or the case law of the European Court of Human Rights do not tell explicitly what the consequences before a national court should be in cases where the length of the proceedings has been excessive.The court held that the issue of excessive length of proceedings is not comparable to a situation where charges are dismissed because of non-compliance with substantial procedural requirements.Moreover, in the court's view, it could not be deduced from the provisions concerning statute of limitations that charges should be dismissed once the reasonable length of proceedings has been exceeded.The court rejected the defendant's claim.However, when considering the merits, the court took into account the length of the proceedings in assessing the punishment.At that time (2003) the case had been pending for almost nine years and, in the court's opinion, especially the pretrial phase had taken an unnecessarily long time.The court referred to the case of Eckle (judgment of 15 July 1982, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 51), in which the European Court of Human Rights had held that the mitigation of a sentence on the ground of excessive length of proceedings might lead to a conclusion that the individual concerned has been afforded redress at the domestic level. The court of appeal upheld the decision of the first instance court, both regarding the preliminary question and the merits.In its decision, the appeal court also noted that while there were no explicit domestic provisions, the dismissal of charges on account of the excessive length of proceedings might be possible on the basis of the ECHR in some exceptional cases, for example in a situation where the defendant's rights of defence have been completely ruined because of the length of the proceedings.However, that had not happened in this particular case. 13.4.2007 / 13.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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